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ABSTRACT 
 China, the United States’ greatest strategic rival, has notably tested a social credit 
system (SCS) since 2014 to regionally monitor citizens as part of a seemingly new digital 
caste system. The SCS, which was scheduled for nationwide release in 2020, is a concern 
for the United States and its allies, as the system will serve as an alternative means for 
China to exert its influence across the country. In addition, given Beijing’s growing 
global presence through China’s Digital Silk Road, the SCS equally poses a threat as an 
external influence on the government and business environments of participating 
countries who may model the system. China’s increased presence and influence could 
threaten the United States’ lead within the Great Power Competition. This thesis explores 
the impact of government social-media monitoring on the civil liberties of citizens 
through a binomial logistic regression and examines the potential for SCS to be adopted 
through a case study of differing governing structures. The thesis conceptually explains 
the vulnerabilities of China’s internal and external influence tactics that should be tracked 
and countered by the United States in an effort to maintain its strategic advantage. 
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As the greatest strategic rival of the United States, China’s national strategy to 
expand its power, while seeking a “great rejuvenation” of its nation by 2049, has serious 
implications for the interests of the U.S. and its allies.1 For centuries, China has utilized 
trade routes, as part of the Silk Road, to spread influence throughout other countries. A 
resurgence of this expansion of power and influence has been observed as a continued 
pattern in recent years through China’s creation and use of the Belt and Road Initiative 
(BRI) and the Digital Silk Road.  
Since 2007, China has regionally tested a social credit system (SCS), a score-based 
reward and penalty system, designed to influence the personal behavior and public conduct 
of Chinese citizens and businesses. Unlike the U.S. FICO credit system that lowers a person 
score based on the timeliness of payments and the amount of debt incurred, China’s social 
credit system is highly intrusive and the social credit scores are based on things such as 
social media behavior, purchasing habits, financial standing, number of children and social 
network. The Chinese government additionally produces a publicly available “Redlist” to 
praise citizens with high scores and a “Blacklist” to shame those with low scores. 
 
Problem 
Since 2014, the Chinese central government has made plans to launch the social 
credit system nationwide, with an original release scheduled for 2020. This is of great 
concern to the United States because the new Chinese system of control could potentially 
serve as a model for countries and businesses currently influenced by China through 
participation in the BRI and Digital Silk Road. A number of countries, including some U.S. 
allies, have notably become dependent on Chinese financial aid, along with support from 
various development projects and business arrangements, which have strengthened 
 
1 “Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China,” U.S. Department 
of Defense, September 1, 2020, 1, https://www.defense.gov/Newsroom/Releases/Release/Article/2332126/
dod-releases-2020-report-on-military-and-security-developments-involving-the-pe/. 
xvi 
bilateral relations with China. If implemented by other nations, the social credit system—
which oppresses the civil liberties and individual rights of citizens—could serve as a 
catalyst for a damaging paradigm shift in the approach to democracy across the globe. 
 
Research Question 
The intent of this research is to address the question: How can the U.S. and its allies 
curtail the Chinese government’s expanding digital influence? This thesis examines the 
impact of government social media monitoring and attempts to assess the probability that 
the perceived success of China’s social credit system could serve as a model for other 
countries and help to further expand Chinese influence.  
 
Methodology 
To address this question, this thesis uses a mixed methodology (both quantitative 
and qualitative) to explore the current social credit systems that are being tested in China, 
the impact of government social media monitoring on civil liberties and democracy, as well 
as the potential for China to export SCS to influence the government and business 
environments of three countries with differing governing bodies—Mongolia, Thailand, and 
Pakistan. To better examine the effect of social media monitoring by the government, a 
logistic regression was conducted to test two hypotheses using country-specific data for 
the dependent variable of civil liberties and the independent variable of Government Social 
Media Monitoring. 
 
Summary of Findings 
The results of the quantitative assessment found that citizens in countries instituting 
greater government social media monitoring will more than likely have significantly less 
civil liberties. It additionally found that countries with greater democracy will more than 
likely have greater access to civil liberties. Given these findings, China’s social credit 
system will likely have a significant impact on the civil liberties and democratic freedoms 
of citizens.  
This thesis also finds that China has an extensive history of using trade routes to 
successfully expand power and exert influence over partner countries. As such, China’s 
xvii 
success in using the social credit system could potentially incentivize countries to 
implement a similar governing structure in an attempt to increase political power. As a 
result, the citizens and businesses in those countries could ultimately become oppressed as 
civil liberties are restricted through government monitoring, which would likely 




To mitigate the findings of this study, this thesis proposes for the U.S. to implement 
a new incentives-based system that recognizes governments and businesses for inclusive 
behaviors as a countermeasure. The U.S. should take full advantage of the upcoming 
change of administration by strengthening bilateral relations with allies and partner nations 
to help launch such a system and effectively assuage the potential spread of Chinese power 
and influence. This thesis also recommends continued future research to evaluate the 
domestic political environments around the world—particularly those that have tribal 
influences, dictatorships, or the financial means to sustain such a system—to best 
determine which countries are most likely to adopt a social credit system. The resulting 
information will serve as  key criteria for helping the U.S. and its allies be best positioned 
to protect the global community from future oppressive practices that will significantly 
restrict democracy. 
xviii 
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1 
I. BACKGROUND TO THE PROBLEM 
In the anthology series “Black Mirror,” an episode in the third season showcases a 
world where citizens, living their everyday lives, build a “social media score” based on 
their daily interactions with others.1 In this society, people rate each other through their 
phones on a scale from one to five stars for every interaction they have—everything from 
talking to someone in passing and being perceived as rude, to the popularity of a social 
media post—which can greatly impact their socioeconomic status. Citizens, who can see 
the score of others as it changes in real time, are given privileges for having a high score 
and are penalized and shunned for having a low score. As Americans, this type of digital 
caste system sounds like a far-fetched work of fiction; however, this is very close to reality 
in China where the government has begun testing a social credit system (SCS) to be 
implemented nation-wide in 2020.2 The State Council, the chief administrative authority 
of China, formally announced plans for the nationwide release of the system in 2014 in 
Planning Outline for the Construction of an SCS.3 This is a concern for the United States 
and its allies, as the SCS system will serve as an additional means for China to exert its 
influence internally and externally by serving as a model for the government and business 
environments of other countries. This move could further threaten the United States, given 
the ongoing Great Power Competition with China, which former U.S. Defense Secretary 
James Mattis identified as the primary concern to U.S. national security.4 
The purpose for China’s nation-wide system, according to a CNBC translation, is 
to create “a social environment in which everyone knows the law, understands the law and 
 
1 Black Mirror. 2016. Season 3, Episode 1, “Nosedive.” Directed by Joe Wright. October 21, 2016, on 
Netflix. https://www.netflix.com/title/70264888. 
2 Genia Kostka, “China’s Social Credit Systems and Public Opinion: Explaining High Levels of 
Approval,” New Media & Society 21, no. 7 (February 13, 2019): 1567, https://doi.org/10.1177/
1461444819826402. 
3 Kostka, 1567. 
4 Jim Mattis, “Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy,” National Defense Strategy (U.S. 
Department of Defense, January 19, 2018), 1–2, https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2018-
National-Defense-Strategy-Summary.pdf. 
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abides by the law.”5 The system, which will both reward and penalize Chinese nationals, 
has been regionally tested throughout China since the plan’s announcement in 2014.6 
Through advancements in Artificial Intelligence and facial recognition software, SCS has 
become very sophisticated in a very short span of time. The United States has long served 
as the leader for commercial cyber capabilities, but with China preparing to launch the 
nation-wide SCS program, release 5G infrastructure, and fully harness AI technology, its 
new structure and lead could potentially serve as a model for other countries—particularly 
countries that are currently influenced by China through development efforts as part of the 
Belt and Road Initiative and Digital Silk Road.7 
This thesis reviews the current SCS systems that are being tested in China; the 
impact of government social media monitoring; the potential for China to export SCS to 
influence the government and business environments in Mongolia, Thailand, and Pakistan; 
and the possible implications for the U.S. and its allies. 
A. APPROACH  
This thesis identifies key vulnerabilities in China’s internal and external influence 
efforts, through the use of its social credit system, that should be monitored and addressed 
by the United States to maintain its strategic advantage. Utilizing a regression analysis, this 
thesis assesses the global impact that government social media monitoring has on the civil 
liberties of citizens. The thesis then reviews China’s successful history of expansion and 
influence through the use of trade routes over the centuries to present day. 
 
5 Evenlyn Cheng and Shirley Tay. “China Wants to Track and Grade Each Citizen’s Actions — It’s in 
the Testing Phase.” CNBC, July 26, 2019. https://www.cnbc.com/2019/07/26/china-social-credit-system-
still-in-testing-phase-amid-trials.html. 
6 Rogier Creemers, “China’s Social Credit System: An Evolving Practice of Control,” SSRN Scholarly 
Paper (Rochester, NY: Social Science Research Network, May 9, 2018), 13–14, https://papers.ssrn.com/
abstract=3175792. 
7 Andrew Chatzky and James McBride, “China’s Massive Belt and Road Initiative | Council on 
Foreign Relations,” January 28, 2020, https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/chinas-massive-belt-and-road-
initiative; Paul Triolo, Clarise Brown, and Kevin Allison, “The Digital Silk Road: Expanding China’s 
Digital Footprint” (Eurasia Group, April 29, 2020), https://www.eurasiagroup.net/live-post/digital-silk-
road-expanding-china-digital-footprint. 
3 
This research examines three countries—Mongolia, Thailand, and Pakistan—to 
identify weaknesses and assess the probability that the countries could be vulnerable to 
further Chinese influence, given their current involvement in China’s Digital Silk Road. 
These three countries were selected due to their differing stages of democracy. This thesis 
examines research on the government and business environments of each country to look 
for patterns that may make them susceptible to China’s influence tactics. Finally, the thesis 
analyzes the findings to determine measures that the United States can adopt to mitigate 
China’s growing influence and maintain its strategic advantage. 
B. LITERATURE REVIEW 
China has notably promoted domestic regime stability through its use of the social 
credit system. Scholars differ on the true purpose behind the system with some believing 
that it has been used by the government in an attempt to regain the trust of citizens,8 while 
others suggest that the government is actually using the system to monitor and control the 
behavior of the local regions in China, whose rewards and punishments may be 
incorporated into its future nationwide system.9 Genia Kostka explains in the Washington 
Post that local governments in over 43 Chinese cities have instituted mandatory pilot SCS 
programs during this test period, monitoring individuals, businesses, social organizations, 
and government departments.10 A CNBC report finds that many of the programs either 
issued citizens with a base score of 1,000 or provided a letter grade from AAA to D. Rogier 
Creemer explains in a 2018 report that the nationwide SCS score would be based on data 
points from a variety of different actions, including online purchases, content posted on 
social media, and the types of friends kept by individuals.11 Creemers stresses that these 
scores would have wide-ranging impact on people’s livelihood, influencing their ability to 
 
8 Martin Chorzempa, Paul Triolo, and Samm Sacks, “China’s Social Credit System: A Mark of 
Progress or a Threat to Privacy?,” Policy Briefs, Policy Briefs (Peterson Institute for International 
Economics, June 2018), https://ideas.repec.org/p/iie/pbrief/pb18-14.html. 
9 Creemers, “China’s Evolving Practice of Control,” 3. 
10 Genia Kostka, “Analysis | What Do People in China Think About ‘Social Credit’ Monitoring?,” 
Washington Post, March 21, 2019, https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2019/03/21/what-do-people-
china-think-about-social-credit-monitoring/. 
11 Creemers, “China’s Evolving Practice of Control,” 3. 
4 
secure employment, loans, mortgages, and travel accommodations, even potentially 
impacting their relationships with family and friends.12 
Scholarly research finds that China’s nationwide SCS will use a reward and 
punishment system that publicly acknowledges and praises citizens, businesses, social 
organizations, and government departments with a high score, but will also serve as a new-
age digital scarlet letter to shame those having a low score. Creemers reports that the 
incentive mechanisms would be implemented via the government, as well as through 
market mechanisms and self-regulatory regimes in certain areas.13 Kostka reports that 
China plans to track those with particularly “trustworthy” behavior on “redlists,”14 and 
says that specific conduct as minute as helping neighbors could potentially impact one’s 
score.15 To encourage citizens to strive for placement on the redlists, the government will 
reportedly make citizens eligible for rewards like tax reductions and easier access to 
government services.16 Charlie Campbell explains in a Time magazine article that those 
not exemplifying good behavior will be placed on a “List of Untrustworthy Persons,” also 
referred to as “blacklists.”17  
To help track citizens and companies, Campbell says government agencies compile 
and share details about various infractions, such as failure to pay fines and defaulting on 
debts, which are then used to deduct points from their SCS score. CNBC further reports 
that even things like being cited for driving under the influence and having children beyond 
the legally allowed limit could impact the score as well.18 Creemers stresses that these 
scores would have wide-ranging impact on people’s livelihood, influencing their ability to 
 
12 Creemers, 3. 
13 Creemers, 13. 
14 Kostka, “What Do People in China Think”; Kostka, “China’s Social Credit Systems and Public 
Opinion.” 1566–1567. 
15 Kostka, “What Do People in China Think.” 
16 Kostka, “China’s Social Credit Systems and Public Opinion,” 1567. 
17 Charlie Campbell, “How China Is Using ‘Social Credit Scores’ to Reward and Punish Its Citizens,” 
Time, January 16, 2019, https://time.com/collection/davos-2019/5502592/china-social-credit-score/. 
18  Evenlyn Cheng and Shirley Tay, “China Wants to Track and Grade Each Citizen’s Actions — It’s 
in the Testing Phase,” CNBC, July 26, 2019, https://www.cnbc.com/2019/07/26/china-social-credit-
system-still-in-testing-phase-amid-trials.html. 
5 
secure employment, loans, mortgages, and travel accommodations, even potentially 
impacting their relationships with family and friends.19 This type of system could 
potentially be modeled by other countries in an attempt to increase global standing. 
Mongolia, Thailand, and Pakistan have been identified to assess potential vulnerabilities 
based on their governance and business structures. 
1. Mongolia 
Mongolia is a young and vulnerable democracy. Some scholars have found that 
external democracy promotion has had a significant impact on the country over the years.20 
Mongolia has been identified to be more susceptible to external influence given its small 
population and strong dependence on foreign aid.21 In particular, scholars have observed 
that the Sino-Mongolian relationship has evolved into a comprehensive strategic 
partnership.22 The scholars noted that in addition to participating in China’s Belt and Road 
Initiative (BRI), Mongolia is also a founding member of the Asian Infrastructure 
Investment Bank that was proposed by China. 
Scholarly research also has found that the United States has helped to support 
Mongolia’s efforts to move into a more democratic direction since the early 1990s.23 The 
countries have also maintained strong bilateral relations and growing commercial ties. 
During former Vice President Joe Biden’s 2011 visit to Ulaanbaatar, he reportedly praised 
Mongolia for being an “emerging leader in the worldwide democratic movement” and for 
being a “close friend and partner of the United States.”24  
 
19 Creemers, “China’s Evolving Practice of Control,” 3. 
20 V. Fritz, “Mongolia: Dependent Democratization,” Journal of Communist Studies and Transition 
Politics 18, no. 4 (December 1, 2002): 75–100, https://doi.org/10.1080/714003620. 
21 Fritz. 
22 Sharad K. Soni, “China–Mongolia–Russia Economic Corridor: Opportunities and Challenges,” in 
China’s Global Rebalancing and the New Silk Road, ed. B. R. Deepak (Singapore: Springer, 2018), 101–
17, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-10-5972-8_9. 
23 Jonathan S. Addleton, Mongolia and the United States: A Diplomatic History, 1st ed. (Hong Kong 
University Press, 2013), 38, https://muse.jhu.edu/book/26809. 
24 Addleton, 44. 
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2. Thailand 
Thailand’s governance structure is unique given its incomplete transition from an 
absolute monarchy after the 1932 revolution.25 Scholars note that democratization in 
Thailand cannot be discussed without taking the monarchy into consideration.26 This has 
led to constraints between military rule and a democratically elected administration. 
Scholarly research notes that deepening political polarization and increasing violence have 
resulted in two coups, including the most recent in May 2014 that was led by the National 
Council for Peace and Order.27 The coup reportedly was launched in an effort to restore 
“perfect democracy” and to “return happiness to people in the nation.”28 
Scholarly research has found that China’s BRI efforts have resulted in practical 
achievements in various areas, including Thailand.29 In particular, China has a joint BRI 
deal between Thailand and Laos for the construction of a new high-speed railway that will 
run from southern China through Laos to the industrial eastern coast of Thailand.30 The 
United States has had a longstanding relationship with Thailand, which became America’s 
first diplomatic partner in 1833, when the two states signed the Treaty of Amity and 
Commerce.31 In recent years, relations between the two countries have reportedly 
progressed as a result of the 1966 Treaty of Amity and Economic Relations, which gave 
the United States unique privileges despite Thailand’s predominately restrictive conditions 
 
25 Federico Ferrara, “Democracy in Thailand: Theory and Practice,” in Routledge Handbook of 
Southeast Asian Democratization, ed. William Case, Routledge Handbooks (United Kingdom: Routledge, 
2015), 351–69, https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315674735-31. 
26 Michael J. Montesano, Terence Chong, and Mark Heng Shu Xun, After the Coup: The National 
Council for Peace and Order Era and the Future of Thailand (Singapore: ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute, 
2019). 
27 Vachararutai Boontinand and Sriprapha Petcharamesree, “Civic/Citizenship Learning and the 
Challenges for Democracy in Thailand,” Education, Citizenship and Social Justice 13, no. 1 (March 1, 
2018): 36–50, https://doi.org/10.1177/1746197917699413. 
28 Boontinand and Petcharamesree. 
29 Sarah Chan, “The Belt and Road Initiative: Implications for China and East Asian Economies,” The 
Copenhagen Journal of Asian Studies 35, no. 2 (2017): 65, https://doi.org/10.22439/cjas.v35i2.5446. 
30 Chan, 65–66. 
31 Kitti Prasirtsuk, “An Ally at the Crossroads: Thailand in the U.S. Alliance System,” in Global 
Allies: Comparing U.S. Alliances in the 21st Century (Australia: ANU Press, 2017), 116, 
https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt1sq5twz.11. 
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for foreign investment.32 Scholars noted that the treaty has allowed American citizens and 
businesses incorporated in the United States or Thailand to maintain a majority 
shareholding or to wholly own companies in Thailand. This effectively gave Americans 
the ability to engage in business in Thailand on the same level as a Thai national, which 
stands true today.33  
3. Pakistan 
Scholars have found that Pakistan’s economy is a mix between a democracy and a 
dictatorship, which has caused the government to face a number of issues due to the 
inconsistent political structure.34 Research finds that the Pakistan military has repeatedly 
intervened with coups over the years to prevent the full development of democracy in the 
country and has ruled for nearly half of the country’s existence.35  Even when not in power, 
the military has reportedly managed to maintain a firm grip on national politics. Scholarly 
research has claimed that the United States has used aid to undermined democracy in 
Pakistan.36 The scholars observed that the United States has primarily provided high flows 
of support to Pakistan under military dictatorships and low support flows for democratic 
governments. 
Scholarly research finds that Pakistan has had a long history of friendly relations 
with China since the 1950s.37 By the 1970s, China became heavily involved in support 
efforts for key areas in Pakistan, including its military, missile and nuclear program, and 
economic sector. Scholars observed that China also notably supported Pakistan during 
 
32 Prasirtsuk, 117. 
33 Prasirtsuk, 117. 
34 University of Balochistan Quetta, Pakistan et al., “Economic Performance of Pakistan Under 
Democracy and Military Regimes,” Journal of Economics, Business and Management 4, no. 12 (December 
2016): 690–94, https://doi.org/10.18178/joebm.2016.4.12.474. 
35 Aqil Shah, “1. The Military and Democracy,” in Pakistan at the Crossroads, ed. Christophe 
Jaffrelot (New York Chichester, West Sussex: Columbia University Press, 2016), 1, https://doi.org/
10.7312/jaff17306-003. 
36 Murad Ali, “US Foreign Aid to Pakistan and Democracy: An Overview,” Pakistan Journal of 
Social Sciences (PJSS) 29, no. 2 (December 2009): 247. 
37 Shakeel Ahmad Ramay, “China Pakistan Economic Corridor - A Chinese Dream Being 
Materialized Through Pakistan,” Sustainable Development Policy Institute, 2016, 2. 
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sanctions imposed by the United States.38 Most recently they found that bilateral relations 
have further increased between the two countries given Islamabad’s participation in 
Beijing’s BRI, as part of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), which involves 
a collection of infrastructure projects across Pakistan. Scholarly research finds that the 
CPEC mutually beneficial for both countries with Pakistan needing it to overcome its 
economic, development, social, and energy problems.39 Meanwhile, China was found to 
need the CPEC deal to further expand its global influence and to secure future supply routes 
for energy and trade goods.  
C. OUTLINE OF THESIS  
Beginning in Chapter II, this thesis takes an in-depth look into China’s social credit 
system, to include its purpose, structure, potential for modeling, and vulnerabilities. 
Chapter III serves as a quantitative assessment of the impact of government social media 
monitoring on the civil liberties of citizens. From there, Chapter IV examines China’s 
history of external influence—both political and business—on other countries through the 
use of physical trade routes, as well as its Digital Silk Road. It then takes a deeper dive to 
examine China’s involvement and influence within the current government and business 
environments for Mongolia, Thailand, and Pakistan. The chapter further analyzes the 
potential for China to influence the adoption of the SCS structure in those identified 
countries and the threat it would pose to the strategic advantage of the current global 
hegemon, the United States, and its allies. Chapter V then presents the conclusion, which 
outlines ways the United States can mitigate the impact of China’s growing influence and 
provides recommendations for future research.  
 
 
38 Ramay, 2. 
39 Ramay, 7. 
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II. CHINA’S SOCIAL CREDIT SYSTEM 
The idea of a “credit system” is not foreign to many, especially within the United 
States where the Fair Isaac Company Score, better known as the FICO score, has been in 
use since 1989 to predict the creditworthiness of U.S. consumers.40 The classic FICO score 
ranges from 300 to 850 and it is calculated based on various factors including the length of 
credit history, debt burden, payment history, types of credit used, and recent searches for 
credit.41 FICO scores, which can also be impacted by things such as bankruptcies, court 
judgments, foreclosures, lawsuits, and liens, are then used by auto and mortgage lenders, 
credit card companies, as well as nearly half of U.S. employers to assess potential risk.42  
Although the FICO score is calculated from a formula comprised of personal 
information, it is significantly less intrusive and damaging than China’s social credit 
system, which runs the risk of being adopted by other countries. This chapter presents the 
structure of the social credit system and examines the internal influence it has on the 
citizens of China. 
A. PURPOSE 
Social credit systems have been tested in China since 2007, when 18 central 
government departments launched local pilot programs following the State Council’s 
release of the Guiding Opinions Concerning the Construction of a Social Credit System.43 
A plan to launch a nationwide system was later announced in 2014 when the State Council 
issued the Planning Outline for the Construction of an SCS, which highlighted the original 
implementation strategy to put the new system in place by 2020.44 The plan stated that the 
purpose of the social credit system is to provide an assessment of citizens, businesses, and 
 
40 Xin Yu and Lucia F. Dunn, “The Impact of Credit Checks on Employment,” SSRN Scholarly Paper 
(Rochester, NY: Social Science Research Network, March 27, 2016), 10, https://doi.org/10.2139/
ssrn.2755346. 
41 Yu and Dunn, 10–12. 
42 Yu and Dunn, 9,12. 
43 Kostka, “China’s Social Credit Systems and Public Opinion,” 1567. 
44 Kostka, 1567. 
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organizations based on observations of their adherence to laws, creditworthiness, and 
overall compliance with China’s ideological framework.45 The Chinese Communist Party 
(CCP) is well-known for its goal of maintaining the party’s power monopoly and 
preventing the opposition from challenging its political dominance, so from a U.S. 
perspective the SCS looks like a more sophisticated way for the CCP to take advantage of 
technology advancements, including artificial intelligence, to further strengthen its 
authority over the public.46  
B. STRUCTURE 
The Chinese government has given permission to ten private companies to take the 
lead on launching pilot internet-based credit ranking systems, including Alibaba’s Sesame 
Credit, which is reportedly held in high regard.47 Sesame Credit works similar to the U.S. 
FICO score system—with citizens receiving a Sesame score range from 350 to 950—
however, the company uses an opaque algorithm that captures a broad range of factors, 
including credit record, financial standing, criminal record, buying habits, social media 
behavior, and allegedly even the types of books that a person reads, to assign a numerical 
rating to citizens.48 Sesame even takes into account the social credit scores within a 
debtor’s social circle, so having associates with a low score within one’s social network 
will negatively affect a consumer’s individual score.49 Other pilot programs reportedly 
deduct points for being negligent on loans, drunk driving, and even for having more 
children than legally allowed.50 
The system pilots use differing methods for evaluating citizens and business—with 
some calculating a numerical score and others providing a letter grade from AAA to D—
 
45 Kostka, “What Do People in China Think.” 
46 Nir Kshetri, “China’s Social Credit System: Data, Algorithms and Implications,” IT Professional 
22, no. 2 (2020): 16, https://doi.org/10.1109/MITP.2019.2935662. 
47 Kshetri, 15. 
48 Kshetri, 14–15. 
49 Kshetri, 15. 
50 Cheng and Tay, “China Wants to Track and Grade Each Citizen.” 
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however, they all include the same basic components.51 Paul Langer presented a 
visualization of the social credit system for the 21st Annual International Conference on 
Digital Government Research that took place in June 2020, which provides a helpful 
breakdown of the general development process and structure of the system, as shown in 
Figure 1. 
  
Figure 1. Social Credit System Development.52 
The visual helps to explain the main conceptual elements of the social credit system 
that are used for the assessment of Chinese citizens and businesses, including profiling, 
reputation scoring, and the government’s overall social engineering of the population—the 
deliberate manipulation of social behavior to regulate the desired characteristics of a 
society. 
 
51 Creemers, “China’s Evolving Practice of Control,” 10,19. 
52 Source: Paul F Langer, “Lessons from China - The Formation of a Social Credit System: Profiling, 
Reputation Scoring, Social Engineering,” in Dg.o ‘20, Dg.o ‘20 (The 21st Annual International Conference 
on Digital Government Research, Seoul, Republic of Korea: Association for Computing Machinery 
(ACM), 2020), 166, https://doi.org/10.1145/3396956.3396962. 
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The planned nationwide social credit system will collect data from various online 
accounts and social media platforms to build a consolidated user profile, as part of the 
profiling component of the system, to use as the basis for the reputation scoring process, 
which designates the numeric social standing of the person or business.53 From there the 
profiling and reputation scoring data is placed in a framework that distributes credits based 
on behavior and action at the discretion of the government.54 Although there are existing 
reputation scoring type systems in place within the U.S., such as credit bureaus and 
commercial loyalty programs that provide incentives for preferred behavior, they do not 
typically attempt to manipulate the population into assuming a specific societal ideal. It is 
the intention behind collecting the data and issuing scores to influence the behavior of the 
population that distinguishes the social credit system from other established credit system 
models and serves as a fundamental parameter of social engineering. 
C. REWARDS AND PENALTIES 
In an effort to further influence the behavior of society, the SCS works as a public 
incentive system, offering both rewards and penalties to individuals and businesses.55 The 
government publishes a “Redlist” of citizens with high scores who exhibit “good” behavior 
and a “Blacklist” for those with low scores exhibiting “bad” behavior, which is released 
publicly to be used for both praising and shaming purposes.56 The system reportedly has 
records available for approximately 990 million individuals and over 25 million companies 
in China that are used by authorities to provide benefits for Redlist members and to impose 
penalties and sanctions on members of the Blacklist.57 Some benefits for those on the 
Redlist include things such as tax reductions, easier access to government services, free 
 
53 Langer, 166. 
54 Langer, 166. 
55 Genia Kostka and Lukas Antoine, “Fostering Model Citizenship: Behavioral Responses to China’s 
Emerging Social Credit Systems,” Policy and Internet 12, no. 3 (2019): 261, https://doi.org/10.1002/
poi3.213. 
56 Mo Chen and Jens Grossklags, “An Analysis of the Current State of the Consumer Credit Reporting 
System in China,” Proceedings on Privacy Enhancing Technologies 2020, no. 4 (October 1, 2020): 89, 
https://doi.org/10.2478/popets-2020-0064. 
57 Cheng and Tay, “China Wants to Track and Grade Each Citizen.” 
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health checks, and less expensive transportation.58 Other benefits include qualification for 
personal loans, fast-tracked visa applications, easier access to rental cars and bikes, free 
health checks, and preferential treatment at hospitals.59 
Separately, punishments for the Blacklist were reportedly regulated in 2016 by 45 
different bodies, including the Supreme People’s Court, the National Development and 
Reform Commission, the People’s Bank of China, the Chinese Youth League, and other 
judicial institutions and government departments, who wrote a memorandum of 
understanding (MOU)  known as the “Joint Punishment System.”60 The MOU outlines 
seven different categories of punishments for the Blacklist, to include first category 
restrictions that impact economic opportunities—such as receiving stock options, issuing 
bonds, limits to establishing companies within the financial sector, participating in 
government procurement programs, and establishing social organizations.61 The second 
category revokes in-kind support and government subsidy privileges.62 The third bans 
individuals from assuming senior positions within state-owned enterprises, social 
organizations, and financial sector companies, while also barring entry into the Communist 
Party and civil or military service.63  
The fourth category for Blacklist punishments restricts individuals from specific 
sectors like fireworks and dangerous chemicals, food, and drugs, in addition to rejecting 
customs authenticated status.64 The fifth category removes eligibility for individuals to 
assume honorary titles and puts new restrictive procedures in place for loan applications, 
while the sixth bans the purchase of land-use rights, real estate, and the exploitation of 
natural resources.65 The seventh and final category for the MOU has become infamous for 
 
58 Kostka and Antoine, “Fostering Model Citizenship,” 261. 
59 Cheng and Tay, “China Wants to Track and Grade Each Citizen.” 
60 Creemers, “China’s Evolving Practice of Control,” 14. 
61 Creemers, 14–15. 
62 Creemers, 15. 
63 Creemers, 15. 
64 Creemers, 15. 
65 Creemers, 15. 
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banning citizens from certain luxuries, including purchasing vehicles, buying or renovating 
homes, the purchase of certain high-value insurance products, first class travel, upscale 
restaurants, luxury hotels and resorts, golf courses, high-speed train or civil aircraft travel, 
nightclubs, international vacations, and even sending their children to private schools.66 
Additionally, people with a low score become ineligible to assume certain influential 
positions, so serving in high-status positions in China like company CEO, news reporter, 
or government official, may require a minimum social credit score.67 In 2018 alone, over 
11 million people in China were reportedly restricted from buying airline tickets and over 
4 million were prevented from buying high-speed train tickets due to their low score, with 
many unaware that they had been blacklisted and having no easy access to an appeals 
process.68  
Many Chinese citizens were actually found to be unaware that they were being 
monitored and tracked by a government-run social credit system, with a number of the 
local pilot programs focusing on businesses and targeting specific professionals instead.69 
Businesses are discouraged from receiving low scores, which could result in degradations, 
cutbacks, increased prices, or an overall denial of services.70 In 2018, over 3.5 million 
businesses were added to the Blacklist for various infractions, such as engaging in fraud 
and generating excessive amounts of pollution, which prohibits them from bidding on 
projects, participating in land auctions, accessing security markets, and issuing corporate 
bonds.71 
Businesses equally receive special Redlist benefits from maintaining a high social 
credit score, which is linked to financial credit and gives better loan access to companies 
 
66 Creemers, 15. 
67 Kshetri, “Data, Algorithms, and Implications,” 14. 
68 Xiao Qiang, “The Road to Digital Unfreedom: President Xi’s Surveillance State,” Journal of 
Democracy 30, no. 1 (2019): 60, https://doi.org/10.1353/jod.2019.0004. 
69 Kostka and Antoine, “Fostering Model Citizenship,” 278–79. 
70 LangerLanger, “Lessons from China - The Formation of a Social Credit System,” 170. 
71 Kshetri, “Data, Algorithms, and Implications,” 17. 
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regarded as more reliable.72 Companies with higher social credit scores also receive special 
access to certain services, products, and better business opportunities.73 
D. INTERNAL INFLUENCE  
Given the social engineering aspect of the social credit system, the Chinese 
government uses a “nudging” approach to unconsciously influence the decision-making 
and behavior of individuals and businesses by providing positive reinforcement through 
indirect incentives.74 The use of the system in that manner can be viewed as a form of 
paternalism, since the government essentially pretends to provide freedom by steering 
Chinese citizens in a direction that is willing taken, yet decisions are not actually made 
independently.75 China is well-known for regulating free speech, civil rights, and 
organized civil society groups, so the social credit system may potentially be used to further 
monitor, track, and punish anti-CCP actions.76 
The Chinese government increased its ability to monitor and track the movements 
and behavior of citizens in 2016 with the adoption of China’s first cybersecurity law, which 
formally mandates that internet service providers must store user data and communication 
content within the country and gives the government unfettered access to all personal 
information and search histories that are regularly captured by global technology 
companies.77 As a result of the law’s facilitation of government access to nearly all 
personal information found online in China, the social credit system—which is premised 
on the colossal invasion of citizen privacy through the use of large-scale monitoring—
provides authorities with an array of new mechanisms to exert control over the 
population.78  
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The use of artificial intelligence has been found to further advance the speed at 
which the Chinese government can monitor, track and publicly shame citizens and 
businesses for bad behavior. Facial recognition software, for example, is reportedly in use 
in a number of intersections in Beijing where the system will identify blacklisted 
individuals and will project their face and identification information on a giant billboard as 
a way to instantly shame them in public for their actions.79 Separately, various pilot 
systems have established partnerships with local telecommunication companies to 
privately shame individuals as well. In Dengfeng an automatic phone message is in use 
that says, “the person you are calling has lost his credit and deemed a defaulter by Dengfeng 
City People’s Court,” to alert callers that the person they are attempting to contact has a 
low credit score.80 The message then provides an additional level of influence by stressing 
the need for the caller to urge the defaulter to fulfill their legal obligations.81 
Technology is also used to influence the population by allowing instant access for 
all citizens to view anyone’s social credit score at any time. Credit China, for instance, 
provides open access for citizens to view the social credit score of others on its website.82 
Separately, the WeChat messaging application released a mini-app that gives users the 
ability to check for social credit system delinquents within a 500-meter vicinity and allows 
them to alert authorities and share the information with other friends through the app.83 
In the business world, having a positive reputation provides a competitive 
advantage for companies since less investment is needed to attract and retain customers, 
particularly in online commerce where reputation serves as a “Social License to Operate” 
in the midst of heavy competition.84 As a result, the government aims to use the social 
credit system as a means to influence and achieve “commercial integrity” by instilling the 
fear of receiving a negative score and ruining a company’s reputation in CEOs, managers, 
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and the general staff of Chinese businesses, which would ultimately impact its ability to 
conduct business not only in China but across the globe.85 
At its core, the basic concepts of the social credit system, including the use of lists, 
are well known and not as concerning to Chinese citizens due to past regime practices that 
included widely publicized personal information via the media.86 If adopted in other 
countries, however, the social credit system would greatly reduce civil liberties, which 
would have a damaging impact on the livelihood and democratic freedoms of local citizens. 
This is a great concern to the U.S. and its allies, as it threatens ongoing efforts to bolster 
democracy worldwide. So the next chapter takes a more in-depth look into the significant 
impact that government social media monitoring can have on citizens across the globe. 
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III. GOVERNMENT SOCIAL MEDIA MONITORING IMPACT 
This chapter analyzes the impact that government social media monitoring can have 
on one’s civil liberties, which include rights such as the freedom of expression and belief, 
rule of law, associational and organizational rights, as well as personal autonomy and 
individual rights, that are protected by law from unjust governmental interference. The 
chapter uses quantitative analysis to answer what impact SCS adoption in other countries 
has on the civil liberties of the individuals in those nations? 
A. HYPOTHESES 
(1) Hypothesis 1 (H1) 
States with governments instituting higher levels of social media monitoring are 
more likely to have a higher country-year incidence of increased legal restrictions on civil 
liberties. 
(2) Hypothesis 2 (H2) 
States that have a greater degree of democracy are more likely to have higher 
country-year incidence of increased civil liberties. 
B. DATA 
To test the hypotheses, data was identified to conduct a regression analysis—an 
examination of the predicted impact of one or more independent variables on a dependent 
variable.87 The method provided an analysis of the influence that government social media 
monitoring has on civil liberties. 
For the dependent variable of civil liberties, data was utilized from Freedom House, 
an annual global report on political rights and civil liberties.88 The data covered 15 
 
87 Amy Gallo, “A Refresher on Regression Analysis,” Harvard Business Review, November 4, 2015, 
https://hbr.org/2015/11/a-refresher-on-regression-analysis. 
88 Noah Buyon et al., “Freedom in the World 2020” (Freedom House, March 4, 2020), 
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indicators from 195 countries and 15 territories between 2013 and 2020. The primary 
independent variable of government social media monitoring came from the independent 
research institute Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem).89 The dataset covered approximately 
202 countries between 2000 and 2019. 
In an effort to increase the reliability of the study results, control variables are 
included in the regressions. Datasets from the World Bank are used to control for Gross 
Domestic Product per capita (GDPPC) and population, as well as internet and mobile 
phone usage, which are used as a representation of media.90 The World Bank’s World 
Development Indicators are a well-known premier compilation of cross-country 
development data. The information covered 220 countries between 1960 and 2018.  
In addition, Democracy was controlled for using the newly released Polity5 data 
from the Center for Systemic Peace.91 The Polity data series contains annual coded 
information on the level of democracy across the world and is widely used in political 
science research. The Polity5 data covered approximately 167 countries between 1946 and 
2018. Violence was also controlled for using Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP)’s 
Georeferenced Event Dataset (GED).92 UCDP is the world’s main provider of data on 
organized violence and the oldest ongoing data collection project of civil war. The data 
covered world event counts from 1989 to 2018.  
 
89 Coppedge, Michael, John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Staffan I. Lindberg, Jan Teorell, David et 
al., “V-Dem [Country–Year/Country–Date] Dataset V10” (Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project, 
2020), https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemds20; Coppedge, Michael, John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen, 
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Pemstein et al., “V-Dem Working Paper Series 2019:21,” 2019, https://www.v-dem.net/en/data/data-
version-10/; Mechkova et al., “Digital Society Project Working Paper 2019:1,” 2019, https://www.v-
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An initial comparison of the 2013 and 2019 data for the dependent variable 
highlights a definite decrease in civil liberties over time, as seen in Figure 2. The data is 
shown using a 7–1 scale, with 1 representing the greatest degree of civil liberties and 7 the 
smallest degree of civil liberties. 
 
 
Figure 2. Civil Liberties Comparison 2013 vs. 2019.93  
Similarly, in Figure 3, a comparison of the 2013 and 2019 data for the independent 
variable highlights a definite increase in government social media monitoring in countries 
 
93 The map in Figure 1, and all other graphics in this report were created using the RStudio program. 
“RStudio.”; Adapted from Buyon et al., “Freedom in the World 2020,” March 4, 2020.  
22 
where civil liberties have decreased. The social media monitoring data originally used a 4–
0 scale, with 4 representing the smallest degree of social media monitoring by the 
government and 0 representing the greatest degree of social media monitoring. Figure 3 




Figure 3. Social Media Monitoring Comparison 2013 vs. 201994 
 
94 Adapted from Coppedge, Michael, John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Staffan I. Lindberg, Jan 
Teorell, David et al., “V-Dem Dataset V10.” 
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To give a more detailed comparison of the initial findings, an overlaid density plot 
was created to show the relationship between social media monitoring and civil liberties, 
as shown in Figure 4.  
 
Figure 4. Overlaid Density Plot95  
The civil liberties data is using a 7–1 scale with 1, shown in green, representing the 
greatest degree of civil liberties. As illustrated, the density plot shows that social media 
monitoring is more prevalent in countries with lower civil liberties. So the correlation 
between social media monitoring and civil liberties can already been seen at this early 
stage. 
 
95Adapted from Buyon et al., “Freedom in the World 2020,” March 4, 2020; Coppedge, Michael, John 
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C. METHODS 
In order to successfully merge all of the datasets to test the hypotheses, 
modifications are made to the data, as outlined below: 
1. Dependent Variable 
Civil Liberties is a measure of rights—including the freedom of expression and 
belief, rule of law, associational and organizational rights, as well as personal autonomy 
and individual—that are protected by law from unjust governmental interference in a given 
target country-year.96 The data used a 7–1 scale, with 1 representing the greatest degree of 
civil liberties and 7 the smallest degree of civil liberties. The indicator was decoded to do 
a dichotomous measure for the regression. The new scale now measures either high or low, 
as shown for 2013 in Figure 5. 
  
Figure 5. Civil Liberties Comparison (Dichotomous Scale)97 
2. Independent Variable 
Government Social Media Monitoring is a measurement of the comprehensiveness 
of surveillance of political content in social media by the government or its agents in a 
 
96 Buyon et al., “Freedom in the World 2020,” March 4, 2020. 
97Adapted from Buyon et al. 
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given target country-year.98 The data used a 4–0 scale, with 4 representing the smallest 
degree of social media monitoring by the government and 0 representing the greatest 
degree of social media monitoring, so the data was reverse ordered to use a 0–4 scale for 
the regression. In addition, a lagged version of the social media monitoring variable was 
created for use as the main independent variable in the regression. A lagged variable was 
included to provide evidence that prior social media monitoring levels are impacting 
subsequent levels of civil liberties. 
3. Control Variables 
Democracy is the measure of the relative democratization of a country in a given 
target year.99 The Polity5 data was already in country-year format and was not found to be 
heavy-tailed, so it did not require additional modification. 
GDP per capita is a measure of a country’s economic output that accounts for the 
number of citizens.100 The data was initially converted into country-year format to match 
the datasets for the dependent and independent variables. The data was found to be heavy-
tailed, as shown in Figure 6, so it was logistically transformed for use in the regression. 
 
98 Coppedge, Michael, John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Staffan I. Lindberg, Jan Teorell, David et 
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Figure 6. Logarithmic (log) Transformation Example101 
Population is the total number of persons in a country in a given year.102 The data 
was initially converted into country-year format to match the datasets for the dependent 
and independent variables. The data was found to be heavy-tailed, similar to Figure 5 
(above), so it was logistically transformed for use in the regression. 
Internet Usage is a measure of the percentage of the population using the internet 
in a given target country-year.103 The data was converted into country-year format to 
match the datasets for the dependent and independent variables.  
Mobile Phones is a measure of the mobile phone subscriptions in a given target 
country-year.104 The data regarding mobile phone subscriptions is important since people 
notably use cell phones to access social media. The data was converted into country-year 
format to match the datasets for the dependent and independent variables. The data was 
found to be heavy-tailed, similar to Figure 6 (above), so it was logistically transformed for 
use in the regression. 
 
101 Adapted from “World Bank Development Indicators | Data.” 
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Violence is a measure of the number of individual events of organized violence in 
a given target country-year.105 The event count figures are extracted from UCDP’s GED 
to focus solely on the phenomena of lethal violence occurring at a given time and place. 
The data was then converted into country-year format to match the datasets for the 
dependent and independent variables. The data was found to be heavy-tailed, similar to 
Figure 6 (above), so it was logistically transformed for use in the regression 
Once all of the data modifications are complete, all of the datasets are merged and 
the resulting data frame included just over 30,000 observations and covered a range from 
2013–2018. From there, given the dichotomous dependent variable, the data was merged 
to run six logistic (logit) regression models. 
D. REGRESSION ANALYSIS 
The results for the regression models used to test H1 and H2 are displayed in  
Table 1. The table shows that media was controlled for using the Internet Usage and Mobile 
Phone variables, and Democracy, GDP, and Violence are controlled for as well. The 
Population variable was found not to be as statistically significant, so it was removed from 
models 3 to 5. The resulting Akaike Information Criterion scores (AIC) are reviewed to 
evaluate the regression models.106 Model 5 was found to be the strongest model since it 
has the lowest AIC score.  
 
105 Sundberg, Ralph and Melander, Erik, “UCDP GED”; Högbladh, Stina, “UCDP GED Codebook.” 
106 Hirotugu Akaike, “A New Look at the Statistical Model Identification,” IEEE Transactions on 
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Table 1. Hypotheses 1 and 2107 
 Dependent variable: 
 Civil Liberties 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Social Media -1.505*** -1.551*** -3.029*** -1.695*** -1.599*** -1.604*** 
 (0.230) (0.246) (0.217) (0.277) (0.277) (0.279) 
              
Democracy 0.609*** 0.465***  0.464*** 0.459*** 0.459*** 
 (0.058) (0.056)  (0.062) (0.061) (0.061)        
Population (log) -0.076 -0.062    0.074 
 (0.069) (0.073)    (0.463)        
GDP per Capita (log)  0.797*** 0.557*** 0.453** 0.451** 0.461** 
  (0.110) (0.160) (0.200) (0.204) (0.212)        
Internet Usage   0.028*** 0.023** 0.022** 0.022** 
   (0.008) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010)        
Mobile Phone (log)   -0.069 -0.100 0.026 -0.043 
   (0.069) (0.078) (0.097) (0.441)        
Violence (log)     -0.186** -0.190** 
     (0.080) (0.084)        
Constant -0.397 -5.967*** 0.023 -3.156* -5.023** -5.186** 
 (1.137) (1.448) (1.554) (1.842) (2.095) (2.332)         
Observations 983 963 926 870 870 870 
Log Likelihood -272.171 -240.669 -269.110 -199.869 -197.084 -197.072 
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Using Model 5, prediction plots are run for the independent variable of Social 
Media Monitoring and the control variable of Democracy to assess the accuracy of the 
hypotheses. In looking at the evidence for social media monitoring in Figure 7, we see that 
at zero we estimate a predicted probability of more than an 80% chance of civil liberties, 
which significantly decreases at 4, representing the greatest degree of social media 
monitoring. This confirms H1, so citizens in countries instituting greater government social 
media monitoring will more than likely have significantly less civil liberties. 
 
Figure 7. Social Media Monitoring Prediction Plot108 
Separately, looking at the evidence for democracy in Figure 8, we see that when 
there is greater democracy at 10, the highest degree of democracy, we estimate a predicted 
 
108 Adapted from Buyon et al., “Freedom in the World 2020,” March 4, 2020; Coppedge, Michael, 
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probability of over 90% chance of civil liberties. In turn, Democracy is shown to negatively 
decrease as civil liberties are reduced. This confirms H2, so citizens in countries with 
greater democracy will more than likely have greater access to civil liberties. 
 
Figure 8. Democracy Prediction Plot109 
F. CONCLUSION 
Given these results, and the potential for China to further exert its influence both 
internally and externally by modeling its social credit system to other countries, the impact 
that government social media monitoring can have on civil liberties should be concerning 
to the United States and its allies. China’s success in using the monitoring system could 
potentially incentivize countries to implement a similar governing structure in an attempt 
to increase political power, particularly countries who currently rely on China as part of 
 
109 Adapted from Buyon et al., “Freedom in the World 2020,” March 4, 2020; “INSCRdata.” 
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the Digital Silk Road. The citizens and businesses in those countries would ultimately 
become suppressed as civil liberties are restricted through government monitoring. 
From there, those countries who have strong ties with China may begin to lessen 
their engagement with the U.S., both politically and economically, as they work to build 
strength and show allegiance to China. Chinese companies, which will be equally 
monitored and rated by the government, may begin restricting business to companies who 
carry a score of equal or greater value to increase the odds of them receiving a favorable 
score. This in turn could carry over and begin impacting the decision-making process for 
business transactions with and within countries that model the SCS structure.  
Such a move could ultimately threaten U.S. national security given the ongoing 
Great Power Competition with China.110 Not only could future business and trade be at 
risk with China, but also with countries that may be influenced to take on the SCS structure.  
The next chapter reviews China’s extensive history of leading efforts to expand 
power and exert influence over partner countries, which could lead to the future spread and 
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IV. CHINESE EXPANSION AND PATTERNS OF INFLUENCE: 
MONGOLIA, THAILAND, AND PAKISTAN  
For centuries, countries have sought to consolidate wealth, strength, and power 
through various means, to include violent methods like waging war with neighboring 
countries or alternatively by forging trade networks. This chapter will provide a brief 
history of China’s past use of physical trade routes to expand the country’s power and 
influence across the globe, leading up to current growth and influence measures through 
the use of digital technology. It then takes an in-depth look at three different countries, 
Mongolia, Thailand, and Pakistan, which have built partnerships with Beijing through both 
the BRI and Digital Silk Road to further assess the potential for China to serve as a model 
for the adoption of the social credit system. The chapter examines each country for its 
current financial standing, technological capabilities, and overall dependencies on foreign 
aid. The chapter does not evaluate domestic political factors within each country to 
determine vulnerability. 
A. SILK ROAD 
The concept of globalization has long been in practice and notably flourished along 
what is known as the Silk Road—a trade route system named for the lucrative trade of 
Chinese silk across the network—which surfaced during the Han Dynasty’s westward 
expansion from 206 BCE–220 CE.111 Some scholars note though that the actual system 
dates back even further to regional trade routes, like the Persian Royal Road that was 
established during the Achaemenid Empire between 550–330 BCE, as well maritime 
connections between China and the West that were present during that time.112  
The trade routes for the original Silk Road reportedly extended for over 4,000 miles 
to Europe, traveling through the present day South Asian countries of Afghanistan, India, 
and Pakistan, as well as the Central Asian countries of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, 
 
111 Chatzky and McBride, “China’s Massive Belt and Road Initiative,” 2; Liang Emlyn Yang et al., 
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Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan.113 In addition to the major commodity of Chinese silk, 
many other goods, technologies, syncretic philosophies, cultural influences, and even 
religions were notably exchanged across the network as well.114 Scholarly research finds 
that trade and contact made along the Silk Road played a significant role in influencing the 
societies and cultures of ancient China, as well as those of the Arabs, Greeks, Iranians, 
Mesopotamians, Mongols, Romans, and Syro-Anatolians, greatly impacting political and 
economic relations across the network of trade routes and border areas.115 
Use of the Silk Road gained momentum around 139 BC when the Han Dynasty 
explored Central Asia and it continued to prosper throughout antiquity and well into the 
Middles Ages under the Islamic and Mongol Empires.116 Trade activity along the route 
reached its peak under the Roman and Byzantine Empires, and the Tang Dynasty in China 
between 618–907 CE, but it ultimately dwindled as a result of the Crusades and advances 
by the Mongols in Central Asia.117 
B. BELT AND ROAD INITIATIVE 
In 2013, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)—also known as “One Belt, One Road” 
or the New Silk Road—evolved from plans announced by President Xi Jinping to build a 
Silk Road Economic Belt and a 21st Century Maritime Silk Road.118 President Xi 
reportedly coined BRI as the “project of the century” with infrastructure investment plans 
set to link countries and regions that account for approximately 60 percent of the world’s 
population and 30 percent of global trade.119 Similar to the ancient trade network, the 
initiative connects China to Africa, Asia, Europe and the Middle East through 
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approximately 900 projects valued at $850 billion.120 China’s primary reported intention 
for this renewed effort is to increase trade and achieve greater economic and cultural 
cohesion with the nearly 70 participating countries.121  
The new initiative, which includes the development of a vast network of railways 
and roads, goes beyond the boundaries of the ancient land based system by including 
additional infrastructural assets like airports, ports, and telecommunication and electricity 
grids that are critical to the economic and social development of the participating 
countries.122 In addition, President Xi reportedly expressed his vision for BRI to help break 
the “bottleneck” in Asian connectivity and to influence the international acceptance and 
use of Chinese currency.123  
Since the BRI announcement, some scholars and business leaders have stressed the 
fact that the initiative can potentially be used by China to strategically expand power and 
increase influence. David Shambaugh, a professor of political science and international 
affairs at George Washington University, noted that culture has long been an important 
pillar in China’s strategy to secure influence internationally, as outlined during the 2011 
plenary session of the 17th Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party.124 
Scholarly research finds that China equally seeks to use the BRI to gain political influence 
as well.125 A 2018 Modern Economy study explained that the BRI has six economic 
corridors that help to geopolitically connect China to Central Asia, Europe, South Asia, 
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and Southeast Asia, which in turn allows for greater promotion of Chinese business, 
economics, and overall influence in the participating countries.126 
C. DIGITAL SILK ROAD 
To further build upon the success of the BRI, China now operates a borderless 
digital network to extend its influence at an accelerated pace. The vision for this new 
“Digital Silk Road” was first mentioned in a white paper that was published in 2015 by the 
National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), the lead agency and driving 
force behind the BRI, along with the Ministry of Commerce, and the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, in which they called for the development of an “information silk road.”127  
The following year, the State Council published the “13th Five-Year Plan for 
National Informatization,” in which they spoke to the construction of an “online Silk Road” 
and the need for full participation from Chinese internet companies.128 President Xi later 
stressed the critical role of the Digital Silk Road in May 2017 during the first BRI forum 
in Beijing and called for next-generation network technologies—including artificial 
intelligence, big data, cloud computing, nanotechnology, smart cities, and quantum 
computing—to be further integrated into BRI to enable “innovation-driven” 
development.129  
China’s push into the global digital economy has been found to be primarily driven 
by its national technology companies, including Alibaba, Huawei, Tencent, and ZTE, who 
are able to produce high-quality products at a low cost through support from government 
subsidies.130 The Chinese firms then use these subsidized products to create technology 
stacks for telecommunications infrastructure and security for smart cities that are offered 
 
126 Sarker et al., “One Belt One Road Initiative of China,” 632. 
127 Triolo, Brown, and Allison, “The Digital Silk Road,” 4. 
128 Hong Shen, “Building a Digital Silk Road? Situating the Internet in China’s Belt and Road 
Initiative,” International Journal of Communication 12, no. 0 (June 29, 2018): 2684. 
129 Shen, 2684. 
130 Brian Harding, “China’s Digital Silk Road and Southeast Asia,” Center for Strategic & 
International Studies, February 15, 2019, 1, https://www.csis.org/analysis/chinas-digital-silk-road-and-
southeast-asia. 
37 
as package deals to help encourage BRI countries to rely on Chinese technology, making 
it more difficult for other companies to conduct business within those countries.131  
As of March 2019, the Standardization Administration of China (SAC) published 
its annual policy objectives that included the enhancement of standards cooperation and 
integration across participating BRI countries, marking the expansion of China’s influence 
and shift from being a standards-taker to a standards-maker.132 In addition, SAC 
announced that China has signed to date approximately 85 standardization agreements with 
49 countries and regions among the BRI partner countries.133 A recent U.S. Department 
of Defense (DOD) report found that this shift is by design, highlighting the fact that China 
actively uses the BRI to form a “more balanced” global governance system built upon the 
Party’s principles, which serves to strengthen and grow the country’s strategic partnerships 
and advance reforms to the international order in support of Chinese strategy.134  
The report further stressed that the Chinese government uses the economic 
influence that it accumulates through the BRI to encourage participating countries to 
support China’s priorities and objectives on a wide range of matters, which could include 
the social credit system.135 An earlier 2017 report from PricewaterhouseCoopers stressed 
the importance of establishing strong and respected relationships with foreign authorities, 
finding that government influence is amplified in many of the participating BRI countries, 
like Mongolia, Thailand, and Pakistan.136 This was especially seen in countries where 
there is a critical need for infrastructure development and regulatory systems are still 
evolving. 
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Mongolia is a young democracy, adopted in 1990, that is landlocked in East Asia, 
bordered by China and Russia.137 The country’s political system is considered to be “semi-
presidential,” having a parliament and prime minister—who heads the government and has 
primary responsibility for executive ministries—as well as a popularly elected president—
who chairs the National Security Council, serves as commander in chief, and plays a 
primary role in foreign policy.138 Mongolia’s small population of 3.23 million citizens, of 
which nearly 60 percent are under 30 years of age, is geographically dispersed across the 
vast territory.139  Freedom House rates Mongolia’s status as “Free,” having an overall 
Freedom in the World score of 84 out of 100, as part of the annual comparative assessment 
of global political rights and civil liberties.140 
With a GDP of US$13.85 billion, Mongolia has been found to be highly dependent 
on international support and at risk of succumbing to donor-dependency pitfalls, having a 
significant portion of its domestic capacity focused on attracting outside assistance instead 
of working to independently resolve problems.141 The Mongolian economy has been 
reportedly recovering from a 2013 slump that began due to unsustainable expansionary 
policies, government mismanagement, falling commodities, and a decrease in foreign 
investment.142 In 2017, the International Monetary Fund sponsored a three-year fiscal 
reform program for Mongolia and provided a US$5.5 billion bailout package that included 
support from IMF, along with the Asian Development Bank, China, Japan, and Korea, 
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among other donors.143 Mongolia’s foreign affairs are reportedly driven by a desire to 
preserve autonomy by balancing relations with key partners, including the U.S., China, and 
Russia, as well as South Korea and Japan.144 
1. China in Mongolia
Mongolia is a developing country that has been found to have become relatively 
dependent on China for its economic growth, particularly from BRI projects.145 In July 
2015, Mongolia solidified its connection to the BRI by jointly signing “The Outline of the 
Construction of China, Mongolia and Russia Economic Corridor,” which was established 
to help build and develop transport routes to ensure the accessibility of goods, vehicles, 
and passengers through the region.146 Mongolia’s Prairie Road Program has served as a 
bridge between China’s BRI and Russia’s Eurasian Economic Union Plan, which supports 
the Eurasian Development Strategy.147 The Center for Global Development released a 
report in March 2018 to warn that 23 of the 68 countries participating in the BRI were 
“significantly or highly vulnerable to debt distress,” and said that eight of them, including 
Mongolia, were particularly at risk of having “an unfavorable degree of dependency on 
China as a creditor.”148 
China reportedly has concerns about U.S. efforts to build up the capacity of the 
Mongolian Armed Forces to participate in global peacekeeping efforts, suggesting it is a 
coverup for devious plans.149 Separately, Russia reportedly is concerned about U.S. ties to 
Mongolia as well, allegedly claiming that Washington is engaged in a “color revolution” 
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in Ulaanbaatar.150 Meanwhile, Mongolia has reportedly remained committed to balancing 
relations between China and Russia, while remaining autonomous.151  
2. U.S.-Mongolia Relations
Over the years, the United States has supported Mongolia’s efforts to declare its 
independence and to preserve its sovereignty. Mongolia formally established diplomatic 
relations with the U.S. in 1987, which the country—bordered by China and Russia—
reportedly describes as its most important “third neighbor.”152 The United States has 
provided targeted government assistance to Mongolia in an effort to support economic 
diversification and private sector-led growth, in addition to fostering the next generation 
of leaders for the country’s young democracy.153 In 2004, the United States stood up the 
Millennium Challenge Corporation, a new international development assistance 
mechanism, and Mongolia was one of the first countries deemed eligible for an MCC 
Compact program, which almost doubled the country’s assistance levels and further 
strengthened U.S.-Mongolian ties.154 The U.S. Agency for International Development 
maintains a partnership with Mongolia to support the country’s continued democratic 
growth and to solidify a path towards self-reliance and greater independence.155 
The U.S. State Department’s Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs explained 
that the United States’ vision for the Indo-Pacific region, including Mongolia and Thailand, 
is for it to be comprised of strong, prosperous and independent nation’s that support good 
governance, participate in fair and reciprocal trade, and respect the individual rights of 
citizens.156 The U.S.-Mongolia trade relationship experienced impressive growth up until 
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about 2012, when U.S. exports peaked at over $665 million—to largely support the 
development of Mongolia’s mining sector—and U.S. imports of goods reached a peak of 
$42 million, but both declined after that time following Mongolia’s economic downturn.157 
Business has reportedly long served as a key part of Mongolia’s economic expansion as 
well; however, U.S. exports have greatly fluctuated over the years, growing from just over 
$40 million in 2009 to a significant high of $650 million by 2012 and then dramatically 
decreasing to $69 million by 2015 due to Mongolia’s economy.158 In recent years, this was 
also observed in regard to U.S. foreign direct investment, which fell by 35.6% to  
$132 million in 2019.159 In recent years, Mongolia has reportedly become one of five 
“priority recipients” for the United States’ International Military Education and Training 
(IMET) assistance in the East Asia-Pacific region, which includes programs that focus on 
increasing transparency, promoting citizen participation in government, reducing 
corruption, and supporting citizen monitoring and oversight of government by 
strengthening civil society.160 
3. Assessment
Given Mongolia’s strong economic ties with China and high risk of becoming 
unfavorably dependent on Chinese support, there is a high probability that the country 
could eventually adopt the social credit system due to the external influences. As Mongolia 
continues to recover from its economic slump, the country may choose to mimic China’s 
structure in an effort to achieve economic success. Mongolia would likely rely on China to 
subsidize the necessary infrastructure for the system, as part of a debt repayment plan, 
placing the country further in debt.  
This move has the potential to directly threaten the U.S. vision for the Indo-Pacific 
region to be comprised of independent nation’s that respect the individual rights of its 
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citizens. SCS use in Mongolia could also directly impact IMET programs within the 
country, which would threaten U.S. efforts to help the country reduce corruption and 
promote democracy. This assessment does not consider domestic political factors that 
could potentially sway Mongolia’s decision to implement the social credit system, so 
further research is required to examine the country’s overall risk. 
E. THAILAND
Thailand, a middle-income country with a population of 69.63 million, is the only 
nation in Southeast Asia to successfully avoid direct European colonization, having a 
monarchy in place since 1782 that later converted to a constitutional monarchy in 1932.161 
Freedom House rates Thailand’s status as “Partly Free,” with an overall Freedom in the 
World score of 32 out of 100, as part of the annual comparative assessment of global 
political rights and civil liberties.162 Thailand’s status actually improved from “Not Free” 
back to “Partly Free” because the country, which has experienced periods of coups and 
military dictatorships, held its first elections last year since a military junta seized control 
in 2014.163 Thailand’s economy, which was ranked in 2018 as the second largest in 
Southeast Asia and the largest within the Mainland at US$487.2 billion, has since risen to 
US$543.65 billion.164 
1. China in Thailand
Thailand, an active BRI participant, and China have maintained friendly relations, 
working jointly on several development projects. Bangkok notably was an early adopter 
of Beijing’s Digital Silk Road initiative, agreeing to cooperate on efforts to promote 
digital technologies, develop e-commerce capabilities, and improve broadband access, as 
well as 
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establish new international standards.165 In February 2020, Thailand became the first 
country in Southeast Asia to launch Huawei’s 5G testbed.166 Thailand had previously setup 
a cloud data center for $22.5 million in its Eastern Economic Corridor, which other Chinese 
tech companies, including Tencent, Alibaba, and JD.com, have expressed an interest in 
investing.167 
Over the years, Thailand, among other countries, has become cautious regarding 
the potential financial burden that certain BRI contracts could impose, expressing a 
willingness to either renegotiate or cancel deals.168 This was the case in 2015 when 
Thailand put a stop to a number of high-speed rail projects until China ultimately 
renegotiated the financial terms.169 In addition to development projects, the DOD noted in 
a recent report that China has likely identified Thailand as a potential location for a Chinese 
military logistics facility, so the bilateral relationship between the two nations is of U.S. 
interest.170 
2. U.S.-Thailand Relations
For over 200 years, Thailand has maintained a friendship with the United States 
and become a key security ally in Asia.171 The two countries, whose first documented 
contract was in 1818, have significantly expanded diplomatic, commercial, and security 
relations since that time.172 In 2003, the United States officially designated Thailand as a 
Major Non-NATO Ally, a status that provides certain benefits to foreign partners in the 
areas of security cooperation and defense trade that serves as a powerful symbol of the 
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close relationship between the two nations.173 In a 2019 report, State Department 
reaffirmed Washington’s commitment to investing in Southeast Asia, to include Thailand, 
one of the six fastest growing foreign direct investment sources in the United States.174 
The U.S. State Department’s Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs explained 
that the United States’ vision for the Indo-Pacific region, including Mongolia and Thailand, 
is for it to be comprised of strong, prosperous and independent nation’s that support good 
governance, participate in fair and reciprocal trade, and respect the individual rights of 
citizens.175 The Department stressed though that the Mekong region of Burma, Cambodia, 
Laos, Thailand, and Vietnam, is facing new challenges that threaten economic 
independence and autonomy, including extraterritorial river patrols, increased organized 
crime and trafficking, as well as debt dependency.176 Despite the risk, leaders from both 
countries recently met, during the inaugural United States-Thailand Energy Policy 
Dialogue that virtually took place in October 2020, and reconfirmed the importance of 
ongoing bilateral cooperation and emphasized the need to promote commercial 
engagement.177 
3. Assessment
Based on Thailand’s strong bilateral relationship with China, early participation in 
the Digital Silk Road, and fractured governance, there is potential for the country to have 
interest in modeling China’s social credit system. In the event of another coup, Thailand’s 
military could potentially seek to control the population through SCS use to help monitor 
and track all citizens while enforcing certain behaviors. As a result, the use of the social 
173 “U.S. Relations With Thailand”; “Major Non-NATO Ally Status,” Fact Sheet (United States 
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credit system by the “partly free” country could have a significant impact on Thailand’s 
long-term friendly relations with the U.S.  
Similar to Mongolia, the system would directly impact the U.S. State Department’s 
vision for the country to support good governance and protect the rights of individual 
citizens. This assessment does not explore internal influences that could potentially impact 
Thailand’s decision to adopt the social credit system, such as the country’s concerns of 
becoming financially dependent on China. So further research is required to assess the 
country’s overall risk. 
F. PAKISTAN 
Pakistan, with a population of 216.56 million, is the fifth populous country in the 
world, which has the 42nd largest economy, with a GDP of US$278.22 billion.178 The 
country is a parliamentary democracy, in which the president serves as the head of state, 
while the prime minister serves as the head of government.179 Pakistan has experienced 
direct military rule—most recently between 1999 and 2008—for almost half of its 72 years 
of independence, outside of time periods of normally weak civilian governance.180 
Freedom House rates Pakistan’s status as “Partly Free,” having an overall Freedom in the 
World score of 38 out of 100, as part of the annual comparative assessment of global 
political rights and civil liberties.181 
Pakistan’s economic growth has reportedly been very robust since 2012, peaking 
at 5.7% in 2017; however, growth rates are under the necessary level to keep pace with the 
country’s rapidly growing population and import needs.182 China currently serves as 
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Pakistan’s largest import partner, while the United States serves as the country’s largest 
export destination.183 The country remains poor despite decades of International Monetary 
Fund-supported reforms and U.S. support, due in part to corruption, which has been severe 
enough to harm foreign and domestic investment, public confidence, and to generate 
uncertainty among international aid donors.184 Over time, Pakistan’s increasing debt will 
eventually lead to a rapid increase in external financing needs in the future.185  
1. China in Pakistan
Pakistan and China have notably built a strong partnership through the Belt and 
Road Initiative, having plans for US$57 billion worth of projects, to include roads, 
railways, port facilities, and power plants.186 Chinese Foreign Ministry Spokeswoman Hua 
Chunhying reportedly remarked that the BRI projects in Pakistan are “open and 
transparent” and that they would help to bolster both bilateral relations and prosperity 
within the region.187 In 2015, President Xi reportedly visited Pakistan to sign over 30 BRI-
related deals that not only included high-speed railways and energy, but also involved new 
digital networks—like ZTE’s digital TV system and Huawei’s fiber-optic cable.188 The 
China-Pakistan Economic Corridor has been described as an exemplar BRI project, 
connecting the Port of Gwadar in Pakistan with Kashgar in west China to help secure an 
alternate route for China’s energy supply that circumvents the unsecure Strait of 
Malacca.189 By traveling through Pakistan and Myanmar by land and sea pipelines, 
China’s energy imports could notably bypass the South China Sea, which would notably 
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reduce the country’s risk of encountering a U.S. naval blockage in the event of a military 
conflict.190 
The Center for Global Development released a report in March 2018 to warn that 
23 of the 68 countries participating in the BRI were “significantly or highly vulnerable to 
debt distress,” and said that eight of them, including Pakistan, were particularly at risk of 
having “an unfavorable degree of dependency on China as a creditor.”191 Pakistan has 
reportedly raised concerns about the potential financial burden that certain BRI contracts 
could impose though, even cancelling the US$14 billion deal for the Diamer-Bhasha Dam 
project due to “unacceptable” financial conditions.192 Separately, the DOD noted in a 
recent report that China has likely identified Pakistan as a potential location for a Chinese 
military logistics facility, so the bilateral relationship between the two nations is of U.S. 
interest.193 
2. U.S.-Pakistan Relations
For over 70 years, the U.S. and Pakistan have strengthened bilateral relations, 
working together on issues of joint concern, including economic growth, energy, peace and 
inclusion, health, and education.194 Within the past two decades, the United States has 
come to view Pakistan as a key ally and has served as a top investor in the country, with 
major investments in agriculture, communications, energy, consumer goods, and 
transportation, among others.195 The United States Agency for International 
Development’s current country development strategy for Pakistan directly supports 
190 Rolland, “Concise Guide,” 6–7. 
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Pakistan Vision 2025—a development plan for Pakistan to become one of the top 25 
economies in the world, with Upper Middle Income status by 2025.196 
In 2019, U.S.-Pakistan trade reportedly reached $6.5 billion, with Pakistan 
receiving a surplus of $1.3 billion.197 The U.S. Commerce Secretary met with senior 
Pakistani officials in July 2020 to discuss strengthening trade and investment ties; however, 
significant issues with Pakistan’s business climate, including discriminatory taxation, 
regulatory barriers, and weak intellectual property protections, which have impeded U.S. 
businesses from operating in the country.198 Additionally, according to a 2018 report from 
the Congressional Research Service, Pakistan’s central involvement in the BRI and China’s 
role as a major creditor have complicated the ability for the U.S. to respond to a potential 
impending crisis and it raises foreign policy and economic issues for Congress.199 
Pakistan has reportedly made some progressive economic reforms to address some 
of the issues, which helped to raise the country’s standing on the World Bank’s 2019 “Ease 
of Doing Business” list to 108—an improvement by 28 ranks since 2018.200 The U.S. 
Department of State noted in 2019 that there is great potential to forge new linkages 
between the businesses, civil society organizations, and educational institutions of the 
United States and Pakistan, noting that the U.S. government supports the expansion of the 
joint trade and investment relationship, which would benefit commerce in both 
countries.201 
196 “USAID - Pakistan”; Planning Commission Ministry of Planning Development & Reform, 
“Pakistan Vision 2025: One Nation - One Vision,” Executive Summary (Government of Pakistan, 2014), 
https://www.pc.gov.pk/uploads/vision2025/Vision-2025-Executive-Summary.pdf. 
197 “U.S. Relations With Pakistan.” 
198 “U.S. Relations With Pakistan.” 
199 Kronstadt and Weiss, “Pakistan’s Economic Crisis,” 1. 
200 “U.S. Relations With Pakistan.” 




As a result of Pakistan’s weak governance,  poor economy, and strong partnership 
with China, the country has a high potential to adopt the social credit system. The “partly 
free” country has also notably had long periods of military rule, similar to Thailand. Given 
the corruption, the social credit system could be used to help the ruling authority control 
and monitor the behavior of local citizens. The system could also be used as a means to 
help address the Islamabad’s desire to increase the country’s global standing. 
This move could greatly restrict individual rights within Pakistan and could impact 
U.S. trade relations with the longstanding ally. The use of the system could also potentially 
cause Pakistan to become further in debt to China, which would escalate ongoing foreign 
policy and economic issues for Congress. This assessment does not evaluate domestic 
political factors that could impact Pakistan’s decision to implement the system, such as 
tribal relations or internal social climate. Therefore, additional research would be required 
to fully investigate the country’s overall risk.  
G. CONCLUSION
China has successfully used the Belt and Road Initiative and Digital Silk Road to
build trust and become a strategic ally for partner nations. The BRI has been found to be 
viewed by participating countries as an expedient platform to secure international 
recognition, while helping to build economic and political power.202 The countries 
observed in the case studies exhibited this line of thought, strengthening bilateral relations 
with China and increasing involvement in BRI projects and Digital Silk Road deals, as an 
attempt for political advancement. Many of the countries though are ultimately working 
against national interests by assuming an exorbitant amount of debt in return for these 
Chinese investments that has caused them to become heavily reliant on China and others 
for financial support.  
Given the strong ties identified between each country and China—including 
infrastructure development, digital technology, and financial aid dependencies—it is clear 
202 Winter, “One Belt, One Road, One Heritage.” 
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that the potential for the social credit system to be adopted exists. However, this chapter 
does not evaluate the domestic political situation within each country to assess to what 
extent the countries would be internally incentivized or disincentivized to utilize such a 
system. Knowing to what degree the social credit system would be socially acceptable and 
logistically feasible within each country is critical to determining which countries are most 
vulnerable for implementing such a system. Therefore, further research is warranted on this 
topic to identify specific countries that will likely model and adopt China’s social credit 
system. 
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V. CONCLUSION  
China’s strategic efforts to expand its power and influence on countries across the 
Belt and Road Initiative and Digital Silk Road have proven to be highly successful to date 
and the future launch of its nationwide social credit system poses a threat for being used as 
a way to further infiltrate and manipulate the countries based on those strong ties. This 
study observes that many countries already view Chinese development and technology 
investments as a vital component for economic success. The value that countries, including 
U.S. allies, place on the ability to increase visibility on the global stage was found to 
supersede concerns that dependencies on China may evolve over time. The resulting 
paradigm shift from the use of the social credit system could not only strengthen national 
allegiance within China but could also help to secure Beijing’s advancement as a leading 
global superpower. 
This study reveals that the implementation of government social media monitoring 
by countries has a significant negative impact on the civil liberties of its citizens. China’s 
social credit system serves as an advanced tool for the government to monitor and track 
Chinese citizens and businesses through social media, so the findings for the damaging 
effect on civil liberties can be expected from use of the system. The study also found that 
when civil liberties are reduced that democracy is negatively decreased as well. This 
significant finding proves that using the social credit system could also result in the 
oppression of democratic values. If used as a model by other countries, China’s social 
credit system could have a detrimental ripple effect on global citizens that would likely 
threaten ongoing U.S. efforts to protect and preserve democratic freedoms around the 
world. 
A. RECOMMENDED MITIGATION MEASURES  
To assuage the interpretation of this analysis, this study proposes for the United 
States to implement a new system that recognizes governments and businesses for inclusive 
behaviors as a countermeasure. The alternate system could provide incentives—such as tax 
breaks, exclusive trade opportunities, and sanctions removal—which could preserve 
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loyalties with current U.S. allies and other countries, while serving as a deterrent from 
dependency on Chinese support. The upcoming change of U.S. administration provides a 
great opportunity for Washington to implement such a system, as the government works to 
strengthen allegiances and renew efforts to serve as a global beacon of democracy. It will 
be imperative for the administration to take full advantage of its first 100 days by 
strengthening relationships with partner nations to effectively mitigate the potential spread 
of Chinese power and influence.  
 One way that the United States can potentially build stronger alliances in the 
immediate future will be to take the lead in addressing the ongoing COVD-19 pandemic. 
The crisis has essentitally brought the world as we know it to a standstill, having a 
devastating impact on government and business operations and leaving many concerned 
about the way ahead. As a result, the world is desperately seeking a leader during these 
unprecedented times to help restore balance and provide a sense of normalcy. As the U.S. 
and western allies lead the way in the production of a vaccine to combat the virus, the 
United States will ultimately serve as a leader for the international community, gaining the 
trust and support of other nations during this time.203 
The new administration also has an opportunity to build stronger ties by focusing 
on taking the lead in world trade partnerships, particularly in an effort to curtail Chinese 
control. U.S. President-elect Biden reportedly stressed that either China will “write the 
rules of the road for the 21st century on trade” or that it will be the U.S.204 So with the 
recent signing of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) agreement—
the world’s largest tariff-free trading bloc that accounts for 30% of the world’s GDP and 
population—between China and 14 other Asia-Pacific countries, the U.S. may need to 
revisit negotiations for the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP)—a proposed free trade 
agreement that does not include China.205 By taking the lead on renegotiating the stronger 
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TPP agreement, the U.S. may be able to successfully counter the impact of the RCEP by 
strengthening bilateral relations with Asia-Pacific nations and weakening Chinese control 
within the region. 
Additionally, the U.S. should counter the proposed investment pact between China 
and the European Union, which has been under negotiation since 2014 to reduce 
restrictions on companies within the two economies.206 China has been working to 
overcome global controversy surrounding the country’s alleged role as the origin of the 
COVID-19 virus, as well as from its actions in Hong Kong and the South China Sea, so 
signing a successful pact with the E.U. would be seen as a great diplomatic victory. As 
such, the U.S. should capitalize on China’s weakened political state by signing a separate 
deal with the European Union to counter the proposed pact with China and to reduce 
Beijing’s influence within the E.U. The deal should be discussed within the “early 
consultations” that President-elect Biden’s National Security Advisor-designate Jake 
Sullivan recently announced would be welcomed with European partners regarding 
“common concerns about China’s economic practices.”207  
In addition, the new administration should also take advantage of the first 100 days 
by taking decisive action to counter China’s maritime and territorial claims that have 
caused a dispute within the South China Sea.208 The U.S. can build relationships with 
countries directly involved in the regional dispute, as well as other ASEAN countries, by 
working to prevent the continued militarization of the artificial islands that have been 
created by China in the area.209 This is of particular U.S. interest as well, as the islands 
help to extend China’s reach into the Pacific, placing the country in target range of U.S. 
bases and territories.  
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By taking these actions within the first 100 days of U.S. President-elect Biden’s 
administration, China watchers agree that the United States can repair relationships with 
key allies and partners and restore the overall confidence and trust in Washington’s ability 
to tackle global challenges.210 The resulting bolstered relationships will allow the United 
States to be better positioned to implement an alternative system that could potentially 
counter China’s social credit system. 
B. FUTURE RESEARCH RECOMMENDATIONS 
As this thesis does not evaluate the domestic political environments of the countries 
within the case studies, further research is required to determine which specific countries 
are most at risk of adopting China’s social credit system. To best make this assessment, a 
decision support technique, such as a 2x2 matrix, could be used to plot various factors that 
would need to exist within a country to make it more inclined to implement a social credit 
system.211 
Some factors for the framework could include: 1) The existence of tribal  power, as 
in countries like Pakistan or Afghanistan, where birthright is an extremely influential factor 
in local decision-making. 2) Identifying a country’s internal climate to know if the system 
would be socially acceptable, especially by the political elite, will be important to know as 
well. There could be significant internal political resistance present that would deter a 
country from developing an SCS. 3) Future research to identify countries that do not have 
a direct relationship with China that could be at risk as well. In particular, countries that 
are governed under a dictatorship or single-party system, like Hungary or Turkey, could 
have great interest in utilizing such a system to further exert control of the population—by 
notably enfranchising certain segments and disenfranchising the others.  
4) In addition to identifying which countries have the will to adopt SCS, the framework 
should also be used to identify which countries have the financial means to independently 
establish such a system. Notwithstanding, China would likely assist with funding SCS 
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infrastructure requirements through debt as it has for countries through its BRI and Digital 
Silk Road projects. 
The framework will help to identify the relative advantage of SCS adoption against 
alternative measures or the status quo, which will ultimately provide key criteria to assess 
the vulnerability of countries at risk of implementing the social credit system around the 
world. By knowing the internal impetus for a country to use the system, the U.S. and its 
allies will be best positioned to protect the international community from future oppressive 
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